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DIRECTIONAL EVOLUTION 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
One way to conceptualize how evolution does not explain away God has focused on guided as 
opposed to unguided evolution. Thus God’s actions has variously been located at the level of 
fine-tuning the initial conditions of life (e.g. Plantinga 2011) or fine-tuning the constraints that 
determine convergent evolution (e.g. Conway-Morris 2003). In each case a hypothesis is being 
added onto standard Darwinian evolution. In this paper I would like investigate whether this is 
necessary and will do so by examining the wide-spread but relatively unexplored assumption, 
namely, that evolution by natural selection alone cannot be directional. I will argue that the 
assumption is based on an unfounded generalization of adaptationism, and that there are in fact 
certain ‘global’ directions present in evolution by natural selection, such as towards behavioral 
flexibility, or towards cooperation. The notion of  God compatible with such an understanding of 
life is not as creator of the blueprints of organisms (Paley), or as creator of constraints and laws 
(Conway Morris), but as creator of several important global tendencies inherent in life itself 
while leaving room for considerable contingency in evolution. 
Directionality in Evolution 
The fact that evolution by natural selection is locally directional is uncontroversial: by definition, 
a population undergoing natural selection tends towards the state of highest fitness. Local here 
means relative to an environment, because it is environmental structure (together with the nature 
of the organisms) that determines which traits lead to optimal reproductive success and thus are 
adaptive. By contrast, global directions are usually held not to exist because environments are so 
variable over time. Hence neither does it make any sense to speak of ‘progression’ in evolution, 
because evolution is the mere succession of adaptations. 
In this way, Conway Morris’ argument (2003) for a global directionality in the ‘inevitability’ of 
human beings fails because he bases it on this notion of local directionality. Thus, for example, 
Conway Morris argument for the inevitability of sentience is based on its observed ubiquity 
across independent lineages of the biosphere (and also ‘inherency’, the ubiquity of the basic 
structures necessary for sentience to develop). However, one can reply that sentience is so 
ubiquitous because of very specific environments that are contingently present on Earth. Strictly 
speaking, there is nothing inevitable about sentience. In this way, because convergent evolution 
is a form of adaptationism, it can provide no ground for any global direction. 
Complexity has been another candidate for global directionality (e.g. McShea 1994). Over the 
course of evolutionary history, increasingly ‘complex’ (both in the functional and morphological 
sense) organisms have appeared. However, as Gould (1996) argues, it is problematic to see any 
global directionality in this. Evolution started from a minimal complexity, so if we take the 
statistical nature of evolution into account, it is quite to be expected that complexity has 
increased in the short term even if there is a tendency towards simplicity. In fact, many lineages 
(such as parasites) have evolved towards simpler structures. 
In this way, after treating convergence and complexity in some detail, in the paper I argue that if 
one is to look for a global direction in evolution, one must look for a trait whose adaptiveness is 
not contingent on any particular environmental structure. This means only traits that are adaptive 
in virtue of properties that all structures possess.  
I propose a candidate: variability in environmental structure. In a fixed environment, a fixed, 
instinctual behavior will be optimal. However, in a variable environment, behavioral flexibility 
will be adaptive. (The variability cannot be too large either: see Godfrey-Smith 1998 for a signal-
detection model of behavioral flexibility.) Variability is not a biological property of any one 
environment, but is a property of at least two environments. The question is, how contingent is 
the condition of variability in environmental structure? I argue that it is not only not contingent, 
but even inherent in evolution by natural selection, as natural selection requires competition 
among various phenotypes to even act. 
In this way, merely because behavioral flexibility adaptive in a variable environment, and 
variability is inherent in natural selection itself, it can be argued that there is a global tendency 
towards behavioral flexibility.  
I argue that this conception of global directionality avoids the short-comings of classic teleology: 
monism, universality, and necessity. First, ‘global’ does neither mean that it is the only such 
tendency. Other global tendencies can be suggested, such as sensitivity to information-content, or 
cooperation and eusociality. Neither is such a tendency universal: there is a plurality of 
ecological niches, and not all of them contain variable environments. Nor does it mean that 
global tendencies are inevitable: circumstances and constraints could conspire against its 
occurrence, for example in an inhospitable world where only extremophile bacteria can survive. 
In merely means that the tendency is inherent in evolution by natural selection itself, and 
contingent on a particular environment. 
A compatible notion of God 
In some ways this represents a statistical understanding of teleology, and there are some 
theological ramifications with respect to the question of the conference. Unlike Paley’s God, who 
creates blueprints of organismic structure, or Conway Morris’ God, who creates the constraints 
and laws that make convergent evolution possible, the notion of God suggested here is a being 
which creates these global tendencies.  
Because of the statistical nature of these tendencies, such a God would allow for contingency and 
plurality in the world, and also would connect natural tendencies to the notion of imago dei. My 
remarks here remain merely suggestive: for example, certain ideals that many religions promote, 
such as forgiveness or generosity, serve to break open closed or tribal social structures and to 
promote flexibility. The same global tendencies governing the evolution of life resurface in 
altered forms in religious ideals. In this way, I suggest that it’s not only possible but also 
plausible that evolution not only does not explain away God, but could in fact reinforce belief in 
God. 
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